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Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP86T00975R000300070027-9

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Trends in Communist Propaganda

26 June 74

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**TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

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26 JUNE 1974

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## ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

## TASS STATEMENT SAYS ISRAELI RAIDS ON LEBANON JEOPARDIZE PEACE

In the first such gesture since May 1970, Moscow on 22 June issued a TASS statement denouncing the Israeli strikes against Palestinian targets in Lebanon that began on the 18th.\* TASS accused Israel of escalating tension in the Middle East at a time when possibilities for attaining agreement on peace were "better than ever." The statement reflects Moscow's continuing effort to build up its image of solidarity with the Arabs, particularly in light of Cairo reports on the 21st that President Sadat had appealed to President Nixon to restrain Israel from further raids on Lebanon.

The TASS statement placed "total responsibility" on the Israeli leadership and government for the "deliberate" buildup of tension, which it said jeopardized the peace and security of all nations in the region. There was no repetition of the vague warning in the May 1970 TASS statement that Israel's "adventurist" policies were fraught with dangerous consequences for Israel itself. Nor did the current statement make even an indirect reference to the United States, as the 1970 statement had done in mentioning Israel's "support from external imperialist circles." But Soviet comment and reportage on the recent raids employed the device of citing Arab sources to link the United States with Tel Aviv's actions. For example, a TASS dispatch from Beirut on the 22d and a Rassadin foreign-language commentary the following day noted that Beirut circles were drawing attention to the fact that Israel's "new aggression" followed shortly after President Nixon's Mideast tour, and TASS on the 23d reported a Lebanese parliamentarian's charge that Israel, "with U.S. connivance," was bombing Lebanon's cities and villages. Moscow's Arabic-language service on the 24th carried a recorded statement by Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir 'Arafat, who called the raids "an American-Israeli imperialist aggression." 'Arafat added that "it was approved and encouraged, as the U.S.-Israeli joint statement reveals, during the visit of U.S. President Nixon to Palestine"--a remark that Moscow deleted during a subsequent Arabic rebroadcast of his statement later the same day.

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\* Moscow in September 1972 atypically issued a Soviet Government statement in response to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Syria. Other than a government statement of March 1968 pegged to an attack on Jordan, the usual Soviet vehicle for response has been a TASS statement, five of which were issued between November 1968 and May 1970 in connection with Israeli attacks on Arab countries.

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Moscow has given low-keyed attention to Israeli Defense Minister Peres' current military aid talks in Washington, but an Arabic-language commentary on the 25th professed to see a connection between his visit and Israel's announced intention of pursuing its actions against the Palestinians. The commentary called attention to reports in Western media of Israel's "nuclear ambitions" and its efforts to obtain a large volume of U.S. military aid, and observed that Tel Aviv should not need all this if the Middle East were really proceeding toward peace rather than war. TASS on the 26th reported that Secretary Schlesinger "tried to justify" the "very impressive" military aid program by arguing that Israel's partial withdrawal under the disengagement agreements "allegedly deprives Israel of its earlier territorial buffer."

## PALESTINIAN ATTACKS

As is typical of Soviet comment on Israeli counteractions, the TASS statement portrayed the victims as peaceful Lebanese and Palestinian civilians and rejected as "totally absurd" Israeli attempts to justify these "villainous actions" as retaliation for "the actions of the Palestinians." Moscow virtually ignored the 13 June fedayeen attack on Kibbutz Shamir which preceded the most recent Israeli counterraids. The only reference to that incident came in a statement by Israeli Communist Party Secretary General Vilner who, according to a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on the 24th, rejected the "traditional justification" of retaliation for extremist actions resulting in the deaths of civilians in Qiryat Shemona, Ma'alot, and Shamir.

Comment and reportage on the 15 May attack in Ma'alot blamed the Israelis for the tragic outcome but conveyed Soviet disapproval of international terrorism in general, along with some cautious criticism of the fedayeen's seizure of children as hostages.\* A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on 25 May, for example, asserted that the holding of pupils as hostages "aroused condemnation among Arab public opinion," and cited a PLO official spokesman as calling the action "a sad affair."

\* Moscow's treatment of the Ma'alot incident and subsequent Israeli attacks on Lebanon is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 May 1974, pages 8-9.

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## EUROPE

## USSR DISPARAGES NATO DECLARATION AS CONTRIVED, CONTRADICTORY

In comment on the semiannual meeting of NATO foreign ministers held 18-19 June in Ottawa, Moscow has portrayed the adopted declaration on Atlantic relations as a display of artificial unity designed to conceal persistent political differences among the various NATO countries. Moscow has also emphasized that the document as a whole is internally inconsistent in that it mixes appreciation of changes under detente with outdated appeals for increased NATO military strength. Expressed principally in generalities and stock denunciations of NATO as a "militaristic anachronism," Soviet comment for the most part has avoided any precise discussion of details in the 14-point declaration. To reinforce its charges that the document is contrived and contradictory, Moscow has stressed its controversial history and has highlighted various passages out of context, in particular the statement in point five that "the essential elements in the situation which gave rise to the [NATO] treaty have not changed."

U.S.-EUROPEAN  
RELATIONS

In recounting the evolution of the new declaration, Soviet comment has pressed the theme that the NATO countries have found it increasingly difficult under present-day conditions to reconcile their national differences. Much of the comment has asserted that the contentious question of arranging appropriate consultations between the United States and its European allies epitomizes these difficulties. Speaking on Moscow radio's weekly international observers roundtable on 23 June, for instance, IZVESTIYA's deputy chief editor Nikolay Polyanov characterized the issue of consultations and relative independence in decision-making as "the heart of the entire problem" for mutual relations within NATO. Polyanov concluded, as have most other Soviet commentators, that the new declaration reflects an attempt, necessitated by the impact of changed world conditions in recent years, to provide the Atlantic alliance with an appearance of unity and NATO with a rationale for existing.

NATO AND  
DETENTE

As is typical in Soviet media treatment of NATO affairs, Moscow has charged that the military alliance represents a narrow-based, outdated approach to European security that is inconsistent with the goals of detente and the ideals of broader all-European cooperation embodied in such approaches as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In this

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regard, Soviet comment has alleged that favorable references to detente and CSCE in the new NATO declaration are canceled out by the document's more predominant and pervasive emphasis on a military-oriented approach to European relations. PRAVDA commentator T. Kolesnichenko, in his Moscow radio review of the week's events broadcast to North America on 24 June, for example, was particularly explicit in claiming that the declaration "stresses a more active NATO war machine." Kolesnichenko added that "in spite of all the talk" recently that NATO would be reoriented toward political problems, NATO's actual goal is "to revive the cold war and the military confrontation between countries with differing social systems."

**BRUSSELS SUMMIT** Moscow has reacted in low-keyed fashion to the Brussels meeting of President Nixon and other NATO heads of state which included the ceremonial signing of the NATO declaration on 26 June. While Soviet media had noted in advance only the fact and purpose of the gathering, TASS on the 26th, reporting that the NATO leaders had signed the declaration, asserted that the document basically repeated the "well-known principles" of the North Atlantic bloc. TASS added that the declaration was "a compromise" between the U.S. desire for the dominant role in NATO and the West Europeans' efforts to increase their say in world affairs.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

### ILICHEV RETURNS TO PEKING; MOSCOW REITERATES BORDER STANCE

TASS announced on 25 June that the chief Soviet negotiator at the stalled Peking border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, had returned to Peking that day after an unprecedented 11-month absence. At the same time Moscow seemed to be signaling that no immediate developments should be expected at the talks by its extensive publicity for a lengthy Polish discussion of the history of the Sino-Soviet border talks first carried in the Polish government paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY. TASS reporting on 23, 24 and 25 June and PRAVDA accounts on the 26th in effect reiterated Moscow's oft-repeated belief that Peking "is not interested in practical and real agreements" with Moscow on concrete border questions and that the next move must still come from Peking.

The ZYCIE WARSZAWY assessment of the talks by Adam Wysocki, co-editor of the paper and a member of the presidium of the Association of Polish Journalists, came on the heels of a 22 June TASS report of a new Soviet Foreign Ministry statement protesting Peking's continued detention of a Soviet helicopter crew. The statement, though it was the fourth since the helicopter's capture on 14 March, was moderate in tone and devoid of threats of retaliatory action. This most recent representation to Peking on the helicopter incident and the return of Ilichev together could be interpreted as evidence of Moscow's intention to continue a persuasive approach in its attempts to obtain release of the crew.

The timing of Ilichev's return may also have been influenced by President Nixon's imminent visit to Moscow. Last year Ilichev arrived in Peking in May after returning to Moscow for the April 1973 plenum--which set the stage for Brezhnev's visits to Bonn and Washington--and subsequently, in the shadow of the Washington summit, presented the Chinese with a proposed nonaggression pact. Moscow's sensitivity to the implications the U.S.-Soviet summit may have for its relations with Peking was registered in a 20 June article by PRAVDA observer Viktor Mayevskiy, who accused Peking of trying to interfere with the Nixon visit.

The lengthy TASS excerpts of the ZYCIE WARSZAWY discussion made clear Moscow's desire to limit the talks to "specifying the border line on some stretches" rather than "recarving the Soviet-Chinese frontier," an aim it imputed to Peking. The article again accused Peking of

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"blocking" the talks by advancing unacceptable preconditions for opening specific technical discussions. In this respect as well as others, Wysocki's analysis closely paralleled the most recent comprehensive account in Soviet media, presented by Oleg Borisov in the 16 May IZVESTIYA. It also pointed to the continuity of Moscow's posture adopted in the wake of Illichev's departure from Peking in July 1973.\*

TASS reported that Soviet Ambassador to Peking Tolstikov and the head of the Chinese delegation to the border talks Yu Chan were among those present at the airport to welcome Illichev. Moscow has regularly reported Illichev's return to the Peking talks from Moscow, but has not recently reported the presence of any Chinese officials to welcome him. Peking, as is its usual custom, did not publicize Illichev's arrival.

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\* Developments in the wake of Illichev's departure are discussed in the TRENDS of 25 July 1973, pages 13-14, and 29 August 1973, pages 4-6.

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## CEMA MEETING

## SOFIA SESSION RECORDS "UNANIMITY," ACCOMMODATES INDEPENDENTS

The communique on the 28th CEMA session, held in Sofia 18-21 June, indicated greater agreement than at last year's meeting in recording an atmosphere of "complete unanimity," as well as friendship and fraternal cooperation. By contrast, last year's final communique on the 27th CEMA session, held in Prague 5-8 June 1973, reported only "complete mutual understanding"--a formulation allowing for unresolved divergent positions--as well as friendship. The meeting in Sofia, which also commemorated CEMA's 25th anniversary, was attended by the USSR's Kosygin and the premiers of the East European member countries and Mongolia, Cuban Deputy Premier Rodriguez, Yugoslav Premier Bijedic, and the North Vietnamese and North Korean ambassadors to Sofia as "observers." The last time bloc party first secretaries also attended a CEMA session was the session held in Bucharest in July 1971, which adopted the long-range CEMA economic integration program.

While the final communique hewed largely to such practical matters as implementation of the 1971 integration program, coordination of national economic plans, and fuel and power, a separate statement issued by the conferees to commemorate the 25th anniversary of CEMA, as well as the speeches by Kosygin and CEMA Secretary Faddeyev, generalized on CEMA's role in terms acceptable to the independently minded Romanians and Yugoslavs.\* Thus, the anniversary "decision" read at the opening session on the 18th by host Bulgarian Premier Todorov and Faddeyev's speech underscored the "sovereignty" and "equality" of the CEMA member countries and the development of economic relations with "all" socialist countries which are not members of CEMA.

In his speech, also on the 18th, Kosygin was effusive in stressing that the "sovereign" CEMA member countries cooperate on the basis of "fraternal unity and absolutely voluntary consent," in

\* Kosygin had a "friendly" talk with Romanian Premier Manescu in Sofia on the 20th, according to TASS. A meeting between the two premiers at the Warsaw Pact meeting in the Polish capital in April had also been described as friendly, while a talk between Brezhnev and Ceausescu on that occasion was characterized merely as "comradely." Kosygin's "exchange of views" with Yugoslav Premier Bijedic in Sofia was reported briefly by Moscow radio on the 20th, with no indication of the atmosphere.

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contrast to the "manifestations of rivalry" said to exist in relations between capitalist states. Kosygin's heavy stress, at the same time, on the role of CEMA in strengthening the cohesion and unity of the socialist countries was in tune with the message sent to the meeting by Brezhnev, broadcast by Moscow radio on the 18th. Brezhnev's message, while underscoring the "equality" of the CEMA member states, did not allude to their sovereignty. Predictably, both the speech by Romanian Premier Manescu at the Sofia meeting on the 18th and the message to the session from Ceausescu stressed the "full" equality, sovereignty, and independence of the CEMA member states, as well as economic cooperation with "all" the socialist states.

While the main pronouncements at the Sofia session, like last year's Prague communique, avoided any direct call for relations between CEMA and the EC, Faddeyev did note on the 18th that detente had "led to the expansion of mutually beneficial economic ties between the CEMA countries and West European and other economically developed capitalist countries." He also noted the agreement signed in May between CEMA and Finland, CEMA's cooperation with the United Nations and other international organizations, and the "interest in cooperation with CEMA" shown by Mexico, Iraq, South Yemen, Argentina "and other countries." Similarly, the anniversary decision hailed CEMA's agreement with Finland, its relations with "more than 20" international bodies, and the military and economic aid given by CEMA countries to North Vietnam.

**YUGOSLAV ROLE** Belgrade's concern to maintain a flexible stance vis-a-vis CEMA appeared reflected in the fact that this year, as at the 1972 CEMA session in Moscow, it was represented by Premier Bijedic, while it had lowered its representation to the deputy premier level at the 1973 meeting in Prague. While not a member of the body, Yugoslavia "participates" in the work of certain CEMA commissions on the basis of a September 1964 agreement. In his speech on the 18th Bijedic underscored the Yugoslavs' "growing interest" in stepping up bilateral and multilateral economic agreements with CEMA member states. Pointedly, he also noted that such principles as sovereignty, equality, independence, and noninterference were "incorporated" in the 1971 CEMA integration program. This year's 21 June final communique went a step further than last year's in stating that Yugoslavia "will take part in the multilateral integration" measures of CEMA; the 8 June 1973 communique said merely that multilateral "cooperation" between the CEMA countries and Yugoslavia would be expanded.

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At the conclusion of the Sofia session a Kicovic commentary carried in the Belgrade domestic service on the 22d implicitly defended Belgrade's independence in the realm of foreign trade, noting that such CEMA members as the USSR, Poland, and Hungary carry on "nearly half" of their foreign trade with non-CEMA countries. At the same time the talk praised Yugoslavia's 10-year participation in CEMA activities, adding that its participation would grow with "the solution of certain unresolved problems, for which a mutual readiness was demonstrated at Sofia." BTA on the 21st reported that Bijedic had been awarded a CEMA anniversary medal, to be given to Tito for the Yugoslav leader's contribution to Belgrade-CEMA cooperation.

PEKING ATTACK NCNA on the 23th noted CEMA's 25th anniversary with a new attack on the organization as an instrument used by the Soviet leaders to plunder, exploit, and "practice neocolonialism in" the CEMA member countries. In documenting these allegations, the commentary pointed to Moscow's relations with the orthodox CEMA members--Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Mongolia--without mentioning the maverick member, Romania. Five years ago, a 5 February 1969 NCNA commentary in the wake of a 21-23 January Moscow meeting commemorating CEMA's 20th anniversary leveled Peking's usual charges against the organization but did not mention the anniversary. This year NCNA on 25 June carried a commentary devoted entirely to the Romanians and CEMA, reviewing articles in the Bucharest biweekly ERA SOCIALISTA and the daily SCINTEIA, both published prior to the Sofia meeting, criticizing "supranational economic integration" as an infringement of sovereignty.

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USSR

## FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS GAIN SUPREME SOVIET STATUS

The list of newly elected Supreme Soviet deputies published in the 19 June PRAVDA reveals that several key figures in the foreign policy establishment have for the first time become members of the Soviet legislature. The most prominent new additions are USA Institute Director G.A. Arbatov, Institute of World Economy and International Relations Director N.N. Inozemtsev, and Brezhnev's personal foreign policy assistant, A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov. P.A. Abrasimov, head of an unidentified Central Committee section in the field of foreign affairs, was reelected to the Supreme Soviet after a lapse of many years. Other new additions include Institute of Marxism-Leninism Director A.G. Yegorov and KGB Deputy Chairman V.M. Chebrikov, while those dropped from the Supreme Soviet include retired senior statesman A.I. Mikoyan, Culture Minister Ye. A. Furtseva, and longtime Central Committee section head N.N. Organov.

The addition of Arbatov and Inozemtsev to the Supreme Soviet clearly reflects the rise in the status of their institutes, since few institute directors have been accorded this honor in the past. The election of Brezhnev's foreign policy assistants A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov and K.V. Rusakov also reflects the increased importance of foreign affairs. Rusakov had been elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1970, at a time when he headed the Central Committee's bloc relations section. The two officials join G.E. Tsukanov, who until this year was the only Brezhnev assistant to hold Supreme Soviet status. Aside from the administrator of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, M.S. Smirnyukov, who was also a Supreme Soviet deputy in 1966 and 1970, no other assistant of Kosygin nor any of Podgornyy's was elected this year.

Abrasimov had been replaced in April 1973 as ambassador to France and became head of a Central Committee section. Although the section has never been publicly identified, Abrasimov has dealt exclusively with foreign affairs--bloc countries, France and the Arab countries--and has lectured at important conferences of Soviet foreign affairs and foreign trade officials in July and December 1973.

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KGB Deputy Chairman V.M. Chebrikov, a former party official from Brezhnev's home oblast of Dnepropetrovsk, was elected to the Supreme Soviet for the first time this year, joining KGB Chairman Andropov and First Deputy Chairman S.K. Tsvigun, an old Brezhnev crony, both of whom had also been elected in 1970.

Mikoyan was presumably not reelected to the Supreme Soviet this year because of age; he is 79. Furtseva's fall from favor was telegraphed by the dissemination of reports linking her to a scandal connected with the construction of an extravagantly expensive personal dacha. The 73-year old Organov, who headed an unidentified section of the Central Committee since early 1967, when he was relieved as ambassador to Bulgaria, presumably lost his Central Committee post by late 1973. While PRAVDA on 3 March 1973 had identified him as first deputy chairman of the Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship Society and as head of a Central Committee section, on 13 November that same paper identified him only in the former post. Organov's section apparently handled foreign affairs, since virtually all his public activities concerned bloc countries and he belonged to the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities' foreign affairs commission.

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## VIETNAM

## HANOI, PRG SCORE U.S. POLICIES, SUSPEND JMC TALKS AGAIN

The Vietnamese communists have taken steps to focus attention on the impasse that exists in their relations with Washington and Saigon, perhaps in an effort to demonstrate persuasively on the eve of President Nixon's Moscow visit their dissatisfaction with the implementation of the peace agreement. The Soviet public stance on Vietnam has moved closer to that of its Vietnamese allies since the last U.S.-Soviet summit during Brezhnev's visit to the United States in June 1973, when Moscow was carefully avoiding any official criticism of U.S. actions in Vietnam. Last fall Soviet leaders began to openly accuse the United States of supporting Saigon "violations" of the peace accord, and this March Moscow for the first time authoritatively endorsed the PRG's six-point program for a political settlement, after virtually ignoring similar proposals for almost a year.

Hanoi took note of the President's departure for Moscow in a 26 June report, and had reflected its attitude toward such summit diplomacy in an article in the June issue of the army journal, TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, broadcast on 24 June. The army journal assailed Nixon's "so-called policy of detente and the strategy of achieving a balance among the big powers, resorting to insidious and crafty political, diplomatic, and economic tricks in the hope of alienating our people from the forces of peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism in the world."

The PRG sought international attention for its complaints against the United States in a 15 June memorandum, publicized on 18 June and sent to the Soviet Union, China, and other participants in the 1973 Paris International Conference on Vietnam.\* Hanoi did not follow the PRG's lead with a memorandum of its own, but its propaganda attacks on U.S. policies included a 24 June article by "Commentator" in the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN DAN, which responded to an 18 June statement released by the U.S. Embassy in Saigon with a caustic attack on Ambassador Graham Martin. And, in a repeat performance of the early May communist walkout from negotiating sessions with the GVN and the United States, the PRG and DRV on 22 and 23 June, respectively, issued foreign ministry statements announcing indefinite suspension of their participation

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\* The PRG memorandum is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 June 1974, pages 23-24.

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in the two-party and four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC) talks--ostensibly because of Saigon's "refusal" to discuss "full implementation" of the privileges and immunities for the communist Joint Military Teams in the South.

NHAN DAN ON MARTIN, KISSINGER      While Ambassador Martin has been the subject of numerous Hanoi attacks in the past, the 24 June Commentator article lent new authority to such criticism and raised the level of verbal abuse directed at the ambassador. The article characterized him as having his hands "stained with blood from the crimes committed daily in the southern part of our country" and termed his "slanders and distortions" to be "indescribably ignominious." According to Commentator, Martin has been "poking his nose into every matter with increasing brazenness," he "curses" those who have "exposed part of the truth" about U.S. "military involvement" in South Vietnam, and "aggressive but foolish, he labels" those opposed to such "involvement" as Hanoi's "agent and tool." Continuing the diatribe against the ambassador, the article scornfully referred to him as a "plenipotentiary governor-general from the United States who is leading the Saigon administration in continuing the war and sabotaging the Paris agreement on Vietnam."

During the war, Commentator articles were a traditional vehicle for commenting on the views of high-ranking U.S. policymakers such as the President and Secretary of State, but since the peace agreement only three such articles had been published under the byline, the most recent only two weeks before the current, fourth one.\* The latest Commentator article strives to present Ambassador Martin's views as an extension of those of Secretary Kissinger--thus, by implication, making the Secretary the unspoken target of the article's attack. For example, Commentator rejected the notion of "U.S. press circles" that there seemed to be "some discordance" between Martin and the State Department and the opinion that Martin "only repeated parrot-like and in a slightly gross and outmoded fashion Nixon's old policy." Instead, Commentator argued that Kissinger's recent testimony before Congress on military and economic aid for the GVN was not a denial of Martin's statements but rather confirmed them.

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\* For a discussion of the last NHAN DAN Commentator article and background on previous articles, see the TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 16-18.

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A more direct attack on Secretary Kissinger appeared in the same issue of NHAN DAN along with the Commentator article, but judging by the account broadcast by Hanoi radio, it was a less authoritative, unsigned commentary. The article, entitled "Mr. Kissinger's Morality," in effect blamed the Secretary for alleged actions creating the current situation in which "peace is in danger of slipping from our grasp." In this connection the article cited charges in the Western press that Kissinger had "prepared" the December 1972 bombing of Hanoi, "urged Thieu to work out land-grabbing plans after Nixon was elected," and provided Thieu with weapons during the month before the peace agreement was signed which have since been used, along with other U.S. material, to "sabotage" the peace accord.

SUSPENSION  
OF JMC TALKS

The justification publicized for the current communist retreat from the negotiating table is much less explicit than it was in May, when Vietnamese communist media reported that the JMC sessions were broken off because of Saigon's alleged unwillingness to grant specific diplomatic privileges and immunities to the military delegations called for in the Paris agreement and in the 13 June 1973 Paris joint communique.\* Aside from a brief mention that the Saigon-Loc Ninh flight had been suspended on 20 June, the latest PRG and LRV foreign ministry statements on the suspension of talks did not list--as did the May statements--which "privileges and immunities" were being denied their teams. Instead, they vaguely called for "guarantees" that all privileges and immunities be implemented. The DRV statement noted that Saigon, "instigated by the United States," has refused to discuss the signing of a "document guaranteeing the privileges and immunities for the military delegations of the PRG and DRV."

## SINKING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE VESSEL DRAWS MILD RESPONSE

The sinking of a DRV "landing craft" by the GVN off the coast of Quang Tri Province on 20 June has prompted mildly worded DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements and a limited amount of low-key media comment. The foreign ministry statements--both released on 21st--described the vessel as a DRV "cargo" ship that was carrying

\* See the TRENDS of 15 May 1974, pages 9-10, and the TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 12-13, for a discussion of the earlier communist walkout from the JMC sessions. The resumption of the talks is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 June 1974, page 18.

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foodstuffs and operating within PRG "territorial waters" at the time of sinking. The statements also demanded the release of "a number of crew members" allegedly seized by the GVN.

Characterizing the action "a very serious act of war and a brazen provocation," the DRV statement blandly warned that Saigon must bear "full responsibility for the consequences." The PRG statement predictably devoted somewhat more space to the territorial issue--taking exception to Saigon's "arrogance" in claiming sovereignty over the waters south of the 17th parallel and demanding "respect" for PRG "territorial waters." A Hanoi radio report of the 25th noted that the DRV statement had been forwarded to the foreign ministries of the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Hungary, Britain, France, Indonesia, and Iran, to the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and to the UN Secretary General.

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## PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

## PEKING SEES INDIAN AMBITIONS IMPEDING IMPROVED RELATIONS

Evidence of revived Peking interest in better relations with India, following the April implementation of UN resolutions on the Indo-Pakistani war, has been tempered by recent signals of Chinese opposition to Indian dominance in South Asia. While Peking has not directly commented on the 18 May Indian nuclear test, PRC media replays of Pakistani reaction to the test as an impediment to improved ties indicate that it is a major factor behind the new hesitance.

On 22 June NCNA quoted Prime Minister Bhutto's observation that India's conducting the test near the Pakistani border showed that New Delhi was using its new power to "threaten" Pakistan. NCNA cited Bhutto's statement that the test had undermined India's international credibility and had "hampered" recent efforts to improve bilateral relations. On 20 June NCNA quoted Defense Minister Aziz Ahmed's stronger statement that the blast "has caused a serious setback in the process of normalization" and that Pakistan would have to "take stock of the new situation that has arisen" before further diplomatic progress would be possible. In view of the close coordination of PRC and Pakistan policy toward India in recent years, NCNA's citation of these remarks can be viewed as indicating serious Chinese reservations about improving their own relations with New Delhi at this time.

Peking had first revived interest in better relations with India following consultations during Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's 11-14 May visit to China. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, in a speech on 12 May, went beyond usual formulas to note China's desire for better relations with countries of the subcontinent, a line repeated by China's representative at the 10 June Security Council session considering Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations. Additionally, Peking media gave noticeably improved treatment to a visiting Indian friendship delegation earlier this month, in contrast to the restrained welcome a similar delegation received last year.\*

\* For background, see TRENDS of 15 May 1974, pages 12-13, and 19 June 1974, page 31.

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Peking at the same time has continued its traditional support for Pakistan and has given increased attention to evidence of opposition to Indian dominance elsewhere on the subcontinent. Teng Hsiao-ping on 12 May carefully balanced his initiative toward New Delhi with a reaffirmation of support for Pakistan's position on Kashmiri self-determination. More recently, a 23 June NCNA article sharply condemned India's alleged effort to manipulate the Sikkim assembly so as to "annex" the country, hailing popular demonstrations and decisions by the king to oppose New Delhi's moves. Peking gave heavy play to China's decision to send a representative to the coronation of the Bhutan king on 2 June, lauding the king's statements in support of friendly ties with China and hailing his determination to preserve sovereignty and to promote self-reliance. NCNA has also recently played up Nepal-India frictions over the presence in India of Nepalese dissidents who conduct raids across the border, and has even endeavored to encourage Bangladesh opposition to New Delhi by highlighting Dacca's opposition to India's recent decision to curtail the flow of the Ganges into Bangladesh.

#### PRC EDITORIAL AVOIDS ISSUE OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN TAIWAN

Peking's low-key treatment of the Taiwan issue in this year's 25 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the 24th anniversary of the start of the Korean war and the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan has reflected a significant relaxation of China's revived concern--earlier this year--over persisting foreign involvement in Taiwan. The editorial made no reference to foreign interference in routinely pledging to fulfill the Chinese "sacred duty" of liberating the island. By contrast, last year's editorial had duly noted that Peking's goal "brooks no interference from any foreign country" and cited determination to "eliminate foreign interference."

Though Peking had gradually displayed less public concern over foreign influence in Taiwan following the signing of the Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese communiques in 1972, comment earlier this year had pointedly revived concern that "foreign diehards" were persisting with efforts to block eventual PRC control of the island. Keynote speeches at a major Taiwan anniversary celebration in February had warned against foreign enemies who "are still vainly attempting to dip their finger in the pie of Taiwan" and advised firmly that the Chinese PLA stands ready to rebuff their advances.\*

\* For background see TRENDS of 6 March 1974, pages 15-17.

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Further underscoring Peking's present relaxation on Taiwan, a 20 June communique and 23 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the establishment of PRC diplomatic relations with Trinidad and Tobago made no mention of Taiwan. The last such omission occurred in the communique and editorial marking the November 1972 establishment of PRC relations with Jamaica.

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## KOREA

## DPRK WAR ANNIVERSARY RHETORIC MAINTAINS CURRENT HARD LINE

Pyongyang utilized the 25 June anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War to reiterate its harsh line toward the United States and its current hard line toward South Korea, while continuing to emphasize its own proposals as the basis for negotiations and progress on the questions of North-South cooperation and eventual reunification. The usual extensive coverage of the event included a NODONG SINMUN editorial, the customary yearly "appeal" to the South, and a mass rally of 200,000 people addressed by Colonel General Yi Yong-mu.

As in last year's speech given by KPA Chief of General Staff O Chin-u, the negotiations between North and South, based on Kim Il-song's various proposals for reunification, were a central theme. Unlike last year, however, when O Chin-u carefully referred to the Pak government as the "South Korean authorities," this year Yi employed harsh characterizations of the South Korean leadership, in line with increasingly severe attacks on Pak in the North's media. Yi assailed the "Pak Chong-hui puppet clique" as not only U.S. and Japanese "stooges" but also "dirty traitors, diabolic fascist hangmen, and bellicose elements . . . ."

This year's "appeal" to the South did not go as far as urging the overthrow of the Pak government--a call last made in a 1971 appeal--but it came close, saying that leaving the Pak government "intact" made reunification "impossible." The appeal urged the South Korean people to "smash the brigandish 'revitalized' dictatorship."

Yi's treatment of the United States was standard for the anniversary. Accusing the United States of pursuing a "two Koreas" strategy in order to permanently divide Korea and "seize at least South Korea alone" as a military base and commodity market, Yi called the U.S. presence in South Korea the basic cause of tension on the peninsula and the primary obstacle to reunification. He charged that the United States "instigated" Pak to rupture the North-South dialog, and that the United States is actively backing a reinvasion of Korea by Japanese militarists. Yi also raised the North Korean peace proposal of March 1974, making the observation, common in any North Korean discussion of the proposal, that the United States has made no "affirmative" response.

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PEKING, MOSCOW Chinese treatment of the anniversary was highlighted as usual by a 24 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. In line with Peking's public approach to the Korean issue over the past year, the Chinese, as in the 1973 editorial, muted criticism of the United States and completely omitted any reference to Japan, one of the North's prime targets. The editorial noted the North's negotiating positions, including the proposal for a direct peace agreement with the United States. While it called for U.S. troop withdrawal, it did not follow the North in insisting that such withdrawal take place "immediately," though it did call for immediate cessation of U.S. military aid to the South. Unlike last year, the editorial included a barb at the Soviet Union in the form of a comment on "power politics and hegemonism."

Like last year, Moscow's treatment thus far has been extremely low-key. Moscow comment has mentioned the presence of "foreign troops" in South Korea, and one broadcast briefly noted the presence of the "Pentagon's" forces, but Moscow has maintained its cautious stance regarding anti-U.S. references. The question of U.S. troop withdrawal was raised only indirectly--by a 25 June broadcast which reported a telegram sent to the DPRK-USSR friendship group from their Soviet counterparts. The broadcast made a passing reference to the Soviet month of solidarity in support of the "struggle for ousting foreign troops from South Korea." The telegram hailed the North's "constructive proposals" for unification, and a radio commentary on the same day called the South's negative stand counter to the "current trend of detente."

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## NOTES

CSCE TIMING: Recent remarks by leading Soviet commentators have finally, albeit indirectly, acknowledged that Moscow has failed in its push to wind up the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at a summit-level meeting this summer in Helsinki. Instead, the Soviet public stance is now being expressed in terms of holding the concluding summit "within" the current year. With this acknowledgment, coming on the eve of President Nixon's arrival in the USSR, Moscow has made clear its desire for a breakthrough arrangement at the Nixon-Brezhnev talks which would enable CSCE to be concluded with a possible autumn summit meeting. A TASS dispatch in PRAVDA on the 18th and PRAVDA political observer Mayevskiy on the Moscow radio observers roundtable program on the 23d both favorably cited a recent statement by FRG Chancellor Schmidt that it was possible to complete the conference "this year." Additionally, PRAVDA's senior political observer Yuriy Zhukov, in an interview with a correspondent of the Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN published in that paper on the 22d, declared that the USSR was "optimistic" regarding the outcome of the conference and "believes that the third stage--the summit talks--will be accomplished successfully within this year." Soviet media, meanwhile, have sought to counter Western press speculation that the third stage of the conference should be delayed or indefinitely postponed, with comment generally citing Brezhnev as asking rhetorically, in his 14 June election speech, what "alternative" to a successful CSCE conclusion can be suggested by those advocating a delay.

PRC LEADERSHIP: Following last week's unofficial poster attacks on Politburo member Hua Kuo-feng and on the Peking revolutionary committee headed by Politburo member Wu Te, Peking has clearly signaled that such attacks do not signify a fall from power by reporting public appearances on 24 June by both men. Each leader was making his first public appearance since 1 June. Hua received an Albanian friendship delegation, and Wu joined Yao Wen-yuan at a performance by an Albanian folk song and dance performance. For the first time this year NCNA identified Wu in his post as head of the cultural group under the State Council.

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## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 17 - 23 JUNE 1974

<u>Moscow (2532 items)</u>		<u>Peking (985 items)</u>	
Supreme Soviet Elections	(24%)	15%	Law of the Sea Conference (2%) 10%
[Brezhnev Speech	(7%)	4%]	Criticism of Lin Piao and (6%) 10%
CEMA 25th Anniversary	(1%)	10%	Confucius
Session			OAU Summit, Somalia (9%) 8%
[Kosygin Speech	(--)	3%]	PRC/Trinidad and Tobago (--) 5%
China	(4%)	6%	Diplomatic Relations
Arab-Israeli Issue	(1%)	5%	Indochina
[TASS Statement	(--)	4%]	PRC Nuclear Test (6%) 3%
Chile	(3%)	3%	(--) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.